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Processing speed, executive function, and age differences in remembering and knowing 
 
     Abstract 
A group of young (n = 52, M = 23.27 years) and old (n = 52, M = 68.62 years) adults studied 
two lists of semantically unrelated nouns. For one list 2 s were allowed for encoding, and for 
the other, 5 s. A recognition test followed where participants classified their responses 
according to Gardiner’s (1988) remember-know procedure. Age differences for remembering 
and knowing were minimal in the faster 2 s encoding condition. However, in the longer 5s 
encoding condition, younger persons produced significantly more remember responses, and 
older adults a greater number of know responses. This dissociation suggests that in the longer 
encoding condition, younger adults utilized a greater level of elaborative rehearsal governed 
by executive processes, whereas older persons employed maintenance rehearsal involving 
short-term memory. Statistical control procedures however, found that independent measures 
of processing speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing, and that 
independent measures of executive control had little influence. The findings are discussed in 
the light of contrasting theoretical accounts of recollective experience in old age.
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Tulving’s (1985) distinction between autonoetic and noetic forms of consciousness has 
provided the conceptual basis for a substantial amount of research into episodic memory. 
Autonoetic consciousness is associated with the type of memory that allows us to intimately 
recreate and relive subjective experiences in our past. By contrast, noetic consciousness 
accompanies memories related to the storage of knowledge and facts in the absence of such 
intimate recollections of their acquisition. This distinction forms the basis of Gardiner’s 
(1988) operational classification that separates recognition memory into remembering and 
knowing. Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000) propose that remembering involves 
autonoetic consciousness and relates to personal experiences of the past that recreate 
previous events and experiences with a clear sense of intimately reliving them. In contrast, 
knowing involves noetic consciousness and concerns knowledge that is held in a more 
impersonal way, and does not possess the awareness of reliving events and experiences.  
 Although an accumulating body of research has investigated age in relation to 
remembering and knowing, there is good reason for further work in the area. For instance, 
the proposition that autonoetic and noetic forms of consciousness are supported by differing 
neural mechanisms (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), suggests that valuable insights may 
be gained into aging processes by investigating remembering and knowing in young and old 
adults. Additionally, several studies have set out to explain age differences in remembering 
and knowing by taking into account measures of executive or frontal lobe function (Bunce, 
2003; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect, Williams, & Anderton-
Brown, 1995), processing speed (Loevden, Roennlund, & Nilsson, 2002), or by investigating 
both types of measure (Clarys, Isingrini, & Gana, 2002). In the present study, we extend this 
work by investigating age variation in remembering and knowing having experimentally 
varied the time allowed for encoding operations. By taking into account independent 
measures of executive function and processing speed, we seek to shed further light on the 
mechanisms that underlie recollective experience in old age. 
 A review of the existing literature suggests that although some studies have found an 
age-related decrease in remembering (e.g., Bunce, 2003; Loevden, et al., 2002; Parkin & 
Walter, 1992; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect et al., 1995, exp 1; Schacter et al., 1997), 
others have not (e.g., Mark & Rugg, 1998; Perfect et al., 1995, exp 2). One explanation for 
the minimal age variance found in some studies may stem from the type of processing 
required during encoding operations. For example, although Perfect and Dasgupta (1997) 
found an overall age effect for remembering, that effect was minimal when the degree of 
elaboration at encoding was taken into account; the greater the depth of encoding in older 
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persons, the more age differences in recollective experience were minimized. Similarly, the 
provision of cognitive or environmental support at encoding in order to structure or enhance 
the depth of processing, attenuates age differences relative to conditions where no such 
support was provided (Loevden et al., 2002). Indeed, cognitive support at encoding was 
found to be particularly beneficial to remembering in older adults of lower frontal lobe 
function (Bunce, 2003). Turning to research findings for know responses, again the evidence 
is inconsistent in that some studies suggest this type of recognition to increase with age 
(Parkin & Walter, 1992; Perfect et al., 1995), whereas others do not (e.g., Bunce, 2003; Mark 
& Rugg, 1998; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). Here too there is the suggestion that elaboration 
or structuring at encoding moderates age differences (Perfect et al., 1995), presumably due to 
the greater depth of encoding such cognitive operations involve. In sum, it appears that there 
are inconsistencies in findings relating to age differences in both remembering and knowing. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that elaboration or structuring of information at 
encoding may be influential in determining age differences in both types of recognition. 
 Regarding underlying neural mechanisms, Wheeler et al. (1997) suggest that one of 
the key roles played by the anterior regions of the frontal cortex is to confer conscious 
awareness, or autonoetic consciousness, on episodic memory. This facilitates the ability to 
intimately relive the past that Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000) refer to. The role of 
the prefrontal cortex in remembering, or recollective experience, is supported by imaging 
work showing right dorsolateral activation during recollection of the sociotemporal context 
of a word’s previous occurrence (Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999). Indeed, 
it is suggested that prefrontal involvement in encoding operations such as semantic 
elaboration and organization (both conscious processes) provide inputs to the medial 
temporal system (Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner, Schacter, 
Rotte, et al., 1998), an area displaying elevated activation during recollective experience 
(Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000). However, the prefrontal 
cortex undergoes some of the most marked neurological changes with age (Uylings & de 
Brabander, 2002), and theoretically such changes have been held to account for many of the 
cognitive deficits exhibited in old age (West, 1996). Given the putative role of the prefrontal 
cortex in conferring autonoetic consciousness during remembering, the foregoing suggests 
that age differences in remembering will be accounted for by individual differences in 
executive or frontal lobe measures. The few studies that have investigated this possibility 
have produced conflicting results, in that two (Bunce, 2003; Parkin & Walter, 1992) have 
found evidence that measures of frontal lobe functioning account for age differences in 
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remembering, and others have found weak (Perfect & Dasgupta, 1995), or no evidence 
(Perfect et al., 1997). The reason for these discrepant findings is not immediately clear as in 
all these studies, age ranges have been similar, word lists have been used, and there has been 
considerable overlap in behavioral measures of frontal lobe function. Additional research is 
required, not least because all of those studies are confirmatory in nature (Parkin & Java, 
2000; Perfect, 1997). That is, the explanatory value of executive or frontal lobe measures was 
not contrasted with measures arising from other theoretical perspectives of cognitive aging. 
For instance, Salthouse (e.g., 1991) has argued that general processing speed accounts for 
much of the age-related variance in memory and other cognitive domains, and has produced 
numerous empirical investigations that support this view (see Salthouse, 1996). In relation to 
recollective experience, one study found that age differences in remembering were 
eliminated after controlling for processing speed (Loevden et al., 2002), and another that took 
both working memory and processing speed into account (Clarys et al., 2002), concluded that 
the latter construct was more influential in explaining age variance in remembering. 
 In the present study we gathered further evidence of relations between processing 
speed, executive function and age differences in remembering and knowing. In the 
experiment, participants performed in two conditions where either 2 s or 5 s were allowed for 
encoding semantically unrelated words. Previous research (Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1994) led us to expect that the longer encoding time would enable a greater level of 
elaborative rehearsal and structuring of information. Because these cognitive operations 
require executive processes supported by the neural structures of the prefrontal cortex, a 
greater level of remembering was expected in this condition. Indeed, Gardiner and colleagues 
demonstrated that extended encoding time is associated with enhanced recollective 
experience in younger adults. However, none of the previous studies that have manipulated 
encoding time in respect to recognition in older adults (e.g., Craik & Rabinowitz, 1985; 
Wahlin, Backman, & Winblad, 1995) have distinguished between remembering and 
knowing. Although there is no empirical evidence of whether additional encoding time will 
enhance older adults’ recollective experience, frontal lobe accounts of cognitive aging (West, 
1996) suggest that older persons would be less likely to initiate the elaborative rehearsal and 
structured encoding strategies that may aid conscious awareness and, therefore, produce 
fewer remember responses in the longer encoding condition. Regarding age variation in 
know responses, the absence of any form of cognitive support to guide elaboration and 
structuring of encoded information in either condition suggests that a greater proportion of 
know responses would be found in older persons. According to Gardiner et al. (1994), such 
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responding is underpinned by maintenance rehearsal in longer encoding conditions. These 
predictions were tested in a sample of younger and older adults. In addition, we recorded 
independent measures of processing speed and executive function. This allowed us to assess 
how far age differences in remembering and knowing were associated with elaborative 
processes related to executive control, or the capacity to process information more rapidly. 
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and four persons (49 men) participated in the study, divided into younger (n = 
52, aged 18 to 36 years) and older (n = 52, aged 61 to 78 years) age groups. Younger adults 
were students of the University of London, and older participants were recruited through 
advertising and contacts at local church groups and charity organizations. The older 
participants predominantly came from professional backgrounds, and the two age groups 
were screened using the National Adult Reading Test (NART) Full Scale IQ (Nelson, 1982). 
Adults over 65 were screened also for signs of dementia using the Mini-Mental State 
Examination (MMSE: Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). All those taking part in the 
present study scored 25 or more on that measure. Demographic data for the two age groups 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Materials 
Episodic memory task. Two lists of 12 semantically unrelated concrete nouns were prepared. 
In one condition, at study, words from one of the lists were presented individually, and bi-
modally (spoken by the experimenter, and presented on cards simultaneously) for 2 s each. In 
the other condition, words from the other list were presented bi-modally but for 5 s each. 
Lists used for the faster and slower encoding conditions, and the order in which conditions 
were administered, were counterbalanced within each age group. Participants performed both 
conditions during a single experimental session.  
A recognition test was administered after participants had completed a distracter task 
(one of either the executive function or processing speed tasks detailed below) lasting 
approximately four minutes. The 12 words were intermixed with 12 “lure” concrete nouns. 
Participants circled items they recognized, and in doing so, classified them as either 
“remember” or “know” following the procedure described by Gardiner (1988). The 48 words 
used in the experiment fell within the frequency range of 401 to 792 words per million (M = 
550.35). 
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Executive function tasks. Two measures relating to frontal and executive function 
were administered. In the FAS Word Fluency Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 
1983), participants orally generated as many words as possible beginning with either F, A, 
and S. One minute was allowed for each letter. Names of places or people, and multiple 
words with the same root, were disallowed. The total score for the three letters is reported 
here. The second task was the backward digit-span (BDS) subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-R (WAIS-R: Wechsler, 1981). Here, participants were required to repeat 
in reverse order sequences of digits that increased in length from the initial trial of two digits. 
For each sequence length, two trials were administered, and a score of 1 was awarded for 
each correct trial. The test terminated if both trials in a particular sequence were incorrect. 
Processing speed. Two measures were used to assess this construct. The first was the 
digit-symbol substitution subtest of the WAIS. The task involved a sheet of paper upon 
which a table of paired digits and symbols was displayed. Below the table were rows of 
paired boxes. In the upper box a digit was displayed and the participant’s task was to fill in 
the blank lower box with the appropriate symbol from the table. Ninety seconds were 
allowed for the task, and the final score was the number of correctly completed symbols in 
that time. 
The second task was a PC-administered four-choice reaction time task based upon 
that of Bunce, Barrowclough, and Morris (1996). Briefly, four black circles appeared 
psuedorandomly in one of four positions either left or right, or above or below, a central 
fixation cross on the PC screen. Participants responded by pressing spatially corresponding 
keyboard keys (S = left upper; C = left lower; L = right upper; M = right lower) with the 
middle and index fingers of their left and right hands. Twenty practice trials were 
administered, followed by 100 test trials. Speed and accuracy were emphasized in the 
instructions. Here we present mean reaction time for correct responses. 
 
Procedure 
Participants attended the laboratory by appointment. On arrival they completed an informed 
consent form, and then those aged 65 and over were screened using the MMSE. At this point, 
several physiological measures were recorded relating to another part of the study. A self-
completion questionnaire recording biographical information was administered, followed by 
the NART. Participants then performed the first of the two recognition conditions (2 s or 5 s 
encoding), after which processing speed and executive function measures were administered. 
To finish, participants performed the second recognition condition. Following debriefing, 
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those who were non-students were paid £6.50 Sterling for participation. Psychology students 
taking part in the study received course credits required for completing their degree.  
 
     Results 
Bivariate associations between the main variables in the study, and descriptive data for the 
recognition variables, are presented in Table 1 and 2 respectively. In Table 1 it can be seen 
that age was significantly associated with higher NART scores, but poorer performance on 
both processing speed measures. The relationships between age and executive function 
measures were statistically unreliable. Significant negative correlations with remember words 
in the 5 s condition suggest that older adults were less able to utilize the additional encoding 
time in this condition. Associations were investigated further through a series of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), where condition (2 s and 5 s encoding time) served as the within-
subjects factor, and age (young or old) as the between-subjects factor. As preliminary T-tests 
found the older group recorded significantly higher NART scores (p<.01, see Table 2), that 
variable was entered as a covariate in all of the ANOVAs reported below. In each condition, 
the number of hits and false alarms were calculated for remember and know responses. 
Although signal detection theory metrics take response bias into account, there are 
uncertainties concerning their use in relation to know responses (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & 
Jennings, 1997). Therefore, in order to adjust for possible response bias in the present 
investigation, we elected to analyse hits adjusted for false alarms (i.e. Hits – False Alarms). 
 
     Table 1 about here 
 
Remember responses 
 Hits. Both main effects for age group and condition were statistically unreliable 
(ps>.34). However, the Age x Condition interaction was significant, F(1,101) = 4.68, 
2
= 
.044, p = .033. Consideration of Table 2 suggests that although the performance of the 
younger group benefited when more time was allowed for encoding, that was not the case for 
older individuals. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this impression in that for the younger 
group, the 5 s condition produced a significantly greater number of hits than the 2 s condition 
(p<.001), whereas that comparison was nonsignificant in the older group. The comparison for 
young and old scores in the 5 s condition was close to conventional levels of statistical 
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reliability (p = .06); younger persons produced a greater number of hits. This comparison was 
nonsignificant in the 2 s condition. 
 False alarms. Analysis of false alarms revealed the age main effect to be significant, 
F(1,101) = 18.35, 
2
= .154, p<.001. Older adults produced a greater number of false alarms 
than younger adults (see Table 2). Neither the main effect for condition nor the Age x 
Condition interaction, were statistically reliable (ps>.72). 
 Adjusted hits. Both main effects for age and condition were statistically unreliable 
(ps>.16). However, the two-way interaction between those factors did attain significance, 
F(1,101) = 4.48, 
2
= .043, p= .037. Again Table 2 suggests that older individuals did not 
benefit from the additional encoding time in the 5 s encoding condition to the same extent as 
younger adults. A pairwise comparison between conditions was significant (p<.001) in the 
younger, but not in the older group. Although the comparison between young and old groups 
in the 5 s condition was statistical reliability (p = .023), it was nonsignificant in the 2 s 
condition. 
 In sum, the findings suggest that the longer encoding period enabled younger adults 
to produce a greater number of remember responses. The age difference was minimal in the 2 
s encoding condition. 
  
     Table 2 about here 
 
Know responses 
 Hits. The main effects for age and condition failed to reach statistical significance 
(ps>.11). However, the Age x Condition interaction was statistically reliable, F(1,101) = 
6.46, 
2
= .060, p = .013. The impression conveyed by Table 2, that older adults produced 
more hits in the 5 s condition, was confirmed by a pairwise comparison in that group (p<.01). 
None of the other comparisons achieved statistical significance. 
 False alarms. In respect to this variable, the main effect for age was significant, 
F(1,101) = 4.78, 
2 
= .045, p =.031. Older adults produced more false alarms. However, 
neither the condition main effect, nor the two-way interaction, achieved statistical 
significance, (ps>.58). 
 Adjusted hits. Although the main effects for age and condition were both 
nonsignificant (ps>.31), the two-way interaction between those factors was statistically 
reliable, F(1,101) = 4.09, 
2 
= .039, p = .046. Table 2 indicates that this was due to a higher 
                                                                                Age and recollective experience 10 
number of responses produced by older persons in the 5 s condition. A pairwise comparison 
between conditions in the older group was significant (p=.029), whereas the equivalent 
comparison in the younger group was nonsignificant. The comparison between young and 
old in the 2 s condition also achieved statistical significance (p=.023). 
 To summarize, the foregoing analyses indicate that the longer encoding time resulted 
in a greater number of know responses in older persons. In the younger group, encoding time 
does not appear to have influenced this type of responding to the same degree. 
  
     Table 3 about here 
 
The mediating role of processing speed and executive function 
A major objective of the present research was to evaluate the extent to which either executive 
function or processing speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing 
where they were found. Before that objective was addressed however, it was important to 
confirm statistically that the respective variables factored appropriately. Therefore, the verbal 
fluency, backward digit span, digit symbol substitution, and choice RT variables were 
subjected to principal component analysis with varimax rotation. Two components emerged. 
The first related to processing speed and comprised of the digit symbol substitution and 
choice RT variables (explaining 37.98% of the variance). Executive function formed the 
second component (verbal fluency and backward digit span), accounting for 33.10 percent of 
the variance. The rotated factor matrix is presented in Table 3 with the factor structures 
emphasized in bold. These results are consistent with the conceptual distinction made 
between executive function and processing speed. 
 Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the extent to which processing 
speed or executive function explained the significant Age x Encoding time interactions 
relating to remember and know words described earlier. Two models were evaluated. In the 
first, recognition scores from the 5 s condition were regressed on scores from the 2 s 
condition at Step 1. It is important to note that the residual from this step represents the 
benefits to recognition performance associated with the longer encoding condition. At Step 2, 
NART scores were added for control purposes due to the significant between-group 
differences in this variable, and at Step 3 age was entered. In Model 2, Steps 1 and 2 were the 
same as for Model 1. However, at Step 3 the factor scores for either processing speed or 
executive function were added, and at Step 4 age was entered. The two crucial elements of 
this procedure are that in Model 1, age at Step 3 attains statistical significance, whereas in 
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Model 2 age is rendered non-significant by the inclusion of the factor scores at Step 3. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Table 4. 
 Processing speed. For remember words, the addition of age in Model 1 significantly 
accounted for four percent of the residual variance attributable to the longer encoding 
condition for both hits and adjusted hits. Notably in both analyses, when factors scores for 
processing speed were taken into account in Model 2, age became non-significant. In relation 
to know words, age significantly added three percent of the variance to hits in Model 1, and 
this too was rendered statistically unreliable when processing speed was controlled for. With 
regard to adjusted hits for know words, age failed to attain significance in Model 1. 
 As the two processing speed measures vary to some degree in the cognitive 
operations they require (the choice RT task is a relatively pure measure of psychomotor 
speed, whereas the digit symbol substitution task involves a substantial memory component), 
it was of interest to assess which of the two variables was most influential in accounting for 
the age-related variance. Therefore, the regression analyses were repeated, but on this 
occasion the raw scores for choice RT and digit symbol were added separately at Step 3. In 
each analysis, beta weights for choice RT were significant, whereas those for digit symbol 
failed to attain statistical significance. Thus, it appears that psychomotor speed was more 
influential in accounting for the age-related variance reported in the foregoing analyses. 
 Executive function. In these analyses, factors scores for executive function were 
added at Step 3 of Model 2. In all analyses, they failed to account for any of the age-related 
variance in either remember or know words. Further analyses where the raw scores for verbal 
fluency and backward digit span were entered separately into the regression equations did not 
modify these null findings. Therefore, it appears that executive function, as measured by the 
variables in this experiment, does not account for age differences in the utilization of 
encoding time, either in respect to remember or know words. 
 
    Table 4 about here 
 
     Discussion 
This is the first study to investigate age differences in remembering and knowing having 
manipulated the time available for encoding operations, and additionally recorded 
independent measures of executive function and processing speed. Two important findings 
were obtained. First, although age differences in remembering were minimal in the shorter 2 
s condition, the results suggested that younger persons used the longer encoding period (5 s) 
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more effectively, and produced significantly more correct remember responses than older 
adults. In contrast however, older persons produced more know responses than younger 
adults in that longer encoding condition. This dissociation is consistent with the view that 
younger persons were more able to utilize the longer encoding time to initiate elaborative 
rehearsal, and this was related to their greater recollective experience. By contrast, the 
findings suggest that older persons employed maintenance rehearsal, and this was reflected in 
their elevated know responding. Second, although effect sizes were modest, processing speed 
but not executive function explained age differences in both remembering and knowing in the 
longer encoding condition.  
 Broadly, the findings are consistent with prior research suggesting an age-related 
decrease in recollective experience (e.g., Bunce, 2003; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Perfect & 
Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect et al., 1995; Schacter et al., 1997), and confirm that the level of 
know responding increases with age in the absence of structuring that aids elaboration and 
organizational strategies at encoding (Perfect et al., 1995). Importantly though, the 
dissociation in age gradients for remember and know words in the longer encoding condition 
suggests that the time allowed for encoding was related to age differences in the level of 
conscious awareness associated with recognition. For younger adults, the results are in line 
with work (Gardiner et al., 1994) showing that longer encoding time, and the elevated 
elaborative rehearsal this allows, increases remember responding. This suggests that 
executive control processes governing elaborative rehearsal underpinned the observed age 
differences in remembering. A key question therefore, was whether the factor scores for the 
executive function measures accounted for the age-related variance in remembering in that 
longer condition. This would provide further evidence that greater elaborative rehearsal and 
structuring in the 5 s condition underpinned younger adults’ greater recollective experience. 
The findings of the regression analyses provided little support for this proposal. Executive 
function factor scores failed to attenuate the age differences in remembering associated with 
the longer encoding condition. Instead, perceptual processing speed accounted for the age-
related variance in both remembering and knowing. 
 This finding is in agreement with two earlier studies that found processing speed to 
explain age differences in recollective experience (Clarys et al., 2002; Loevden et al., 2002). 
However, given the widespread evidence that declines in processing speed are one of the 
most marked features of cognitive aging, in the present context, it is perhaps not surprising 
that perceptual speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing in the 
longer encoding condition; given extra time, younger adults are able to process more 
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information, and this is likely to be explained by independent measures of processing speed. 
The key point though, is the qualitative dissociation in conscious awareness distinguishing 
the two age groups. It appears that for younger adults, elaboratively processing more 
information resulted in a greater level of conscious awareness in recognition. For older 
adults, it seems that although more information was processed in the longer encoding 
condition, that processing was shallower, and resulted in elevated know responding. This 
latter finding suggests that older adults used a greater level of maintenance rehearsal. That is, 
non-associative rehearsal processes that serve to maintain material in short-term memory 
(Woodward, Bjork, & Jongeward, 1973). 
 The lack of association between executive function measures and age differences in 
remembering was unexpected, particularly given the hypothesized relations between 
elaborative rehearsal and executive control. Two factors may explain this finding. First, 
earlier work (Bunce, 2003) has shown that the provision of cognitive support to guide 
elaboration and structuring attenuates remembering deficits in older adults of lower frontal 
lobe function. In the present experiment, cognitive support, or instructions concerning how to 
encode information, were not provided. It is possible therefore, that before older adults 
initiate elaborative rehearsal processes, some form of cue is required (e.g., explicit 
instructions or some form of cognitive support embedded in the to-be-remembered 
materials). The absence of both cognitive support and encoding instructions in the present 
study may account, therefore, for the minimal influence of executive control measures. 
Second, it is possible that, operationally, the two measures of executive function (FAS test 
and backward digit span) did not access the executive processes involved in elaborative 
rehearsal and structuring with sufficient rigour. Had a more extensive range of executive 
control measures been employed, it is possible that a greater proportion of the age-related 
variance in remembering would have been accounted for. 
 It is worth commenting on the finding that the purer measure of speed, the 
psychomotor task, accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing, whereas the 
digit symbol substitution task did not. Although commonly used as a measure of perceptual 
speed, this latter task is not particularly pure. Not only does it contain a substantial memory 
component but previous research (Piccinin & Rabbitt, 1999) suggests that learning of the 
symbol-number combinations significantly improves performance. Such learning may 
involve some of the elaborative and structuring capacities held to underpin recollective 
experience in the present research. Therefore, the failure of this measure to account for age 
differences in remembering is noteworthy, as it indicates further the methodological 
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difficulties associated with independent measures and their ability to capture elaborative and 
structuring processes.  
 A further possibility that requires consideration is that the psychomotor task 
responsible for the main mediating effect was tapping a more general factor relating to fluid 
intelligence. This raises the possibility that fluid intelligence underpinned the findings in 
respect to processing speed and as such, recent research by Duncan and colleagues (2000) is 
informative. They have produced imaging data suggesting selective activation of the lateral 
frontal cortex during a high demand fluid intelligence task. Therefore, if our measure was 
reflecting a higher-order general intelligence factor, it is possible that factor was supported 
by the neural substrates of the frontal cortex, the brain area held to sustain autonoetic 
consciousness during remembering.  
 These possibilities aside, the mixed findings with respect to executive processes in 
the present study limit any firm conclusions concerning the role of autonoetic consciousness 
in age differences in recollective experience. On the one hand, following predictions, levels 
of remembering were elevated in younger adults following the longer encoding time. This is 
consistent with the view that the hypothesized elevations in elaborative rehearsal in that 
condition underpinned age differences in remembering. On the other hand, the independent 
measures of executive function failed to account for those differences. To clarify associations 
further, it is important that future work employs a more extensive range of executive control 
measures, and includes some manipulation of encoding instructions in study conditions of 
varying lengths. Moreover, as noted elsewhere (Parkin & Java, 2000; Perfect, 1997), such 
research should contrast further the competing theoretical accounts of age differences in 
recollective experience providing the focus for the present study. 
 Several important conclusions arise from this research. First, our findings suggest that 
following an experimental manipulation of the time allowed for encoding operations, a 
dissociation relating to the level of conscious awareness in recognition occurs in younger and 
older adults. Second, it appears that younger persons were able to utilize the additional 
encoding time to process more information to a greater depth, and therefore, report a greater 
level of remembering. By contrast however, although older adults processed more 
information, it appears that the level of processing was shallower, and in consequence a 
greater level of recognition in the absence of conscious awareness resulted. Finally, although 
executive processes were implicated in age differences in recollective experience, 
independent measures of perceptual speed explained those differences. Clearly, further work 
is required that not only evaluates the encoding conditions influencing remembering and 
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knowing in older adults, but also empirically contrasts competing theoretical accounts of the 
cognitive processes underpinning age differences in recollective experience.
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 Table 1. Bivariate correlation matrix 
 
Variable    1      2      3      4     5     6     7     8     9    10      11     12     13     14    15     16 
1. Age group     -                
2. Gender -.02      -               
3. NART  .35** -.11       -              
4. Exec Func  .06 -.07  .41**      -             
5. FAS  .11 -.08  .41**  .84**     -            
6. BDS -.13 -.06  .20*  .76**  .30**      -           
7. Speed -.79**  .08 -.24*  .00 -.05  .21*      -          
8. DSST -.65**  .19 -.11  .21*  .14  .25*  .84**      -         
9. 4 choice RT  .68**  .06 -.21*  .04 -.02 -.13 -.88** -.50**       -        
10.  R hits 2s  .00  .24* -.05 -.03  .00 -.03  .14  .12 -.13       -       
11.  R hits 5s -.21*  .13 -.12  .04  .09  .04  .24*  .14 -.30**  .53**       -      
12. Adj R hits 2s -.03  .23* -.02 -.01  .02 -.01  .19  .15 -.17  .99**  .52**       -     
13. Adj R hits 5s -.24*  .13 -.09  .05  .10  .05  .27**  .15 -.33**  .53**  .99**  .53**       -    
14. K hits 2s -.07 -.22*  .22*   .06  .01  .07  .03  .08  .02 -.66** -.45** -.63** -.43**      -   
15. K hits 5s  .13 -.08  .13 -.06 -.08 -.05 -.12 -.05  .18 -.50** -.87** -.47** -.85**  .53**       -  
16. Adj K hits 2s -.12 -.25**  .23*  .07  .04  .07  .06  .09 -.02 -.65** -.44** -.61** -.42**  .96**  .52**        - 
17. Adj K hits 5s  .06 -.06  .14 -.06 -.07 -.05 -.05  .00  .10 -.34** -.78** -.36** -.75**  .50**  .92**  .52** 
 
Notes. NART = National Adult Reading Test; FAS = Verbal fluency; BDS = Backward digit span; DSST = Digit symbol substitution task; R 
= Remember; K = know; Adj = Adjusted; Variables 4 and 7 are based upon factor scores 
 
* p<.05; **p<.01 
Table 2. Means scores (SD) for demographic, executive function, processing speed, 
and recognition variables for young and old groups 
 
 Young Old Overall 
Demographic    
         Age 23.27 (4.86) 68.62 (4.30) 45.94 (23.24) 
         Women (%) 53.85 51.92 52.89 
         NART           107.52 (8.20) 114.06 (9.69) 110.79 (9.52) 
    
Executive function    
         Verbal fluency  42.62 (10.24) 45.04 (8.06) 43.83 (11.42) 
         Backward DS 7.06 (1.98) 6.58 (1.81) 6.82 (1.90) 
    
Processing speed    
         Digit symbol  71.42 (10.94) 52.29 (11.38) 61.86 (14.69) 
         4-CRT (ms) 381.01 (52.96) 503.05 (78.31) 442.03 (90.47) 
    
Remember    
         Hits           2 s 5.81 (3.33) 5.82 (3.39) 5.82 (3.34) 
                          5 s 7.40 (3.26) 5.98 (3.40) 6.69 (3.39) 
    
         False alarms 2 s     0.12 (0.32) 0.31 (0.61) 0.22 (0.50) 
                              5 s 0.04 (0.19) 0.23 (0.51) 0.14 (0.40) 
    
         Adjusted hits 2 s 5.69 (3.35) 5.51 (3.41) 5.60 (3.37) 
                              5 s  7.37 (3.25) 5.75 (3.41) 6.56 (3.41) 
    
Know    
         Hits               2 s 3.19 (2.50) 2.82 (2.53) 3.01 (2.51) 
                              5 s 2.96 (2.74) 3.69 (3.10) 3.33 (2.93) 
    
         False alarms 2 s     0.37 (0.69) 0.61 (0.77) 0.49 (0.74) 
                              5 s 0.33 (0.97) 0.65 (1.66) 0.49 (1.36) 
    
         Adjusted hits 2 s 2.83 (2.52) 2.22 (2.44) 2.52 (2.49) 
                             5 s  2.64 (3.04) 3.04 (3.66) 2.84 (3.36) 
    
Note.  NART: National Adult Reading Test 
 DS: Digit span 
 CRT: Choice reaction time 
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Table 3. Principal component analysis rotated factor matrix  
 
                   Component 
  
      Processing speed   Executive function 
   
             FAS -.046 .836 
             Backward DS  .206 .763 
             Digit symbol  .837 .207 
             CRT            -.880 .037 
   
   
 
Note. 
 FAS: Verbal fluency 
 DS: Digit span 
 CRT: Choice reaction time 
 Factor structures emphasized in bold 
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Table 4. Hierarchical multiple regression: The mediating influence of processing 
speed on age differences in remembering and knowing 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2
A
 
 Step Beta ∆ R
2
 Step Beta ∆ R
2
 
Remember       
       
 DV = Hits 5 s 1. Hits 2 s .53 .28*** 3. Speed .16 .02 
 2. NART -.09 .01 4. Age gp -.20 .01 
 3. Age gp -.21 .04*    
        
DV = Adj Hits 5 s 1. Adj Hits 2 s .53 .28** 3. Speed .16 .03 
 2. NART -.08 .01 4. Age gp -.24 .02 
 3. Age gp -.22 .04**    
Know       
         
DV = Hits 5 s 1. Hits 2 s .53 .28*** 3. Speed -.14 .02 
 2. NART .01 .00 4. Age gp .18 .01 
 3. Age gp .19 .03*    
        
DV = Adj Hits 5 s 1. Adj Hits 2 s .52 .27***    
 2. NART .02 .00    
 3. Age gp .14 .02    
       
 
Notes. 
 
Step 1 df = 1, 102; Step 2 df = 1, 101; Step 3 df = 1, 100; Step 4 df = 1, 99 
 
* p<.05; ** p<.02; *** p<.01 
 
A. In Model 2, Steps 1 and 2 are as in Model 1 
 
Adj = Adjusted; gp = group 
